Bypassing health providers : the quest for better price and quality of health care in Chad by Gauthier, Bernard & Wane, Waly
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4462
Bypassing Health Providers:
























































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4462
This paper investigates individuals’ bypassing behavior 
in the health sector in Chad and the determinants of 
individuals’ facility choice. The authors introduce a 
new way to measure bypassing using the patients’ own 
knowledge of alternative health providers available to 
them instead of assuming that information as previously 
done. The authors analyze how perceived health care 
quality and prices impact patients’ bypassing decisions. 
The analysis uses data from a Quantitative Service 
Delivery Survey in Chad’s health sector carried out in 
2004. The survey covers 281 primary health care centers 
and 1,801 patients. The matching of facility data and 
patient data allows the analysis to control for a wide range 
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of important patient and facility characteristics, such as 
income, severity of illness, quality of health care, or price 
of services. The findings show that income inequalities 
translate into health service inequalities. There is evidence 
of two distinct types of bypassing activities in Chad: (1) 
patients from low-income households bypass high-quality 
facilities they cannot afford to go to low-quality facilities, 
and (2) rich individuals bypass low-quality facilities and 
aim for more expensive facilities that also offer a higher 
quality of care. These significant differences in patients’ 
facility choices are observed across income groups as well 
as between rural and urban areas. 
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1   Introduction 
 
In most Sub-Saharan African countries, weak competition in the health sector 
creates a situation where the population is often faced with local primary health 
providers which are monopolies. Despite this, some individuals choose to be treated 
in health centers farther away from their homes, and thus incur greater time and 
transport costs in order to obtain services perceived as better adapted to their needs.  
Such bypassing of health centers has been shown by Akin and Hutchinson 
(1999) as being an important phenomenon in Sri Lanka. In the rural district 
studied, they found that close to 2/3 of individuals seeking treatment bypassed   
nearer facilities and in particular that the more severely ill patients tend to be more 
likely to bypass health facilities. Leonard et al (2002) examined bypassing in 90 
villages in Tanzania and found that patients seek higher quality providers with 
better staff and basic supplies and tend to understand the importance of these 
factors for their illness conditions.  
In this paper, we examine bypassing of health centers by individuals in Chad 
and the determinants of individuals’ facility choice. We analyze how bypassing 
decisions are influenced by differences in quality, prices and competition among 
health providers across different socioeconomic groups. We make use of data 
collected in Chad as part of a Health Facility Survey organized by the World Bank in 
2004 to examine empirically how bypassing decisions are influenced by differences 
in service quality, level of competition, and patients’ socio-economic characteristics. 
The survey covers 281 primary health care centers in 21 districts as well as 1,200 
health care employees and 1,801 patients. The matching of facility data with 
personnel and patient data allows us to control for patients’ characteristics and 
incomes, types of illnesses, quality of facilities and price of services in determining 
facility choices.  
Furthermore, we examine individuals’ decisions to seek health services 
among formal and informal health providers. Informal providers in Chad represent 
an important part of the health sector in rural and urban areas. Accounting for 
these providers allows a better understanding of individual choices with respect to 
health services.    2
Contrary to Akin and Hutchinson (1999), who found that bypassing behavior 
is not very different across income groups in Sri Lanka, we find evidence of two 
distinct types of bypassing behaviors in Chad: poor individuals tend to bypass higher 
quality facilities because they cannot afford them whereas richer individuals bypass 
lower quality facilities and go for better care. Furthermore, we find that bypassing is 
significantly more prevalent among higher income groups. In that respect, income 
inequalities in Chad create health service inequalities. There are significant 
differences in patients’ choice of facility across income groups as well as between 
rural and urban populations..  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the health sector in 
Chad. Section 3 presents the data from the health facility survey. Section 4 
documents the available health infrastructure and services in Chad. Section 5 
describes patients’ characteristics and facility choices. Section 6 presents evidence of 
bypassing activities and examines differences among income categories. Section 7 
introduces a simple theoretical model of bypassing. Section 8 presents econometric 
estimates of bypassing activities and Section 9 concludes the paper. 
 
2  The Health Sector in Chad 
 
Chad, a Central African country with a population of 8.8 million, is one of the 
poorest countries in the world, and with a GDP per capita of US$304 ranks 100th 
out of 103 countries (UNDP, 2005). Since independence in 1960, the country has 
experienced ongoing political instability which culminated in the 1979 civil war. Its 
economy is based mainly on agriculture and cattle rearing. The primary sector 
accounts for 38% of GDP and employs about 80% of the labor force. The adult 
illiteracy rate is 74.5%. Only 34% of the population has access to safe water and 8% 
to sanitary facilities. 
 
2.1  Health Indicators 
Health indicators in Chad are low and are even below what would be expected at the 
equivalent level of GDP (World Bank, 2004). Life expectancy at birth is 43.6 years 
and the child mortality rate (under 5 years) is 200 per 1,000 live births. Mother 
mortality is among the highest in Africa, close to 1100 for 100,000 live births. The   3
health problems affecting the population are mainly infectious diseases and 
parasites (malaria, diarrhea, respiratory infections). Outbreaks of meningitis and 
cholera are frequent in the country and cause many deaths among the poor and 
destitute.  
 
2.2  Health System and Services 
The health system in Chad is structured into four levels of responsibility. First, the 
ministry of health (MoH) is at the highest level and is in charge of stating national 
objectives for the health sector and formulating the adequate health policies. In 
second come the 14 Regional Health Delegations (RHDs) which are in charge of 
implementing the national strategy and managing health personnel at the regional 
level. Each RHD is composed of several districts for a total of 49 in the country. The 
districts, which constitute the third level of the health system, manage each several 
health facilities within their responsibility. Finally, the health facilities are at the 
bottom of the pyramid and are responsible for the provision of health services to the 
population. As of 2003, only 407 health centers out of 657 were functional (World 
Bank, 2004) and most could not provide all the services included in the minimum 
package of activities. 
There are currently three doctors, two midwives and 4 nurses per 100,000 
inhabitants, significantly below the WHO standard of 10 doctors, 20 midwives and 
20 nurses. The vast majority of formal health sector personnel are active in the 
public and non-profit sectors. The formal, private for-profit, sector employs less than 
1% of the health personnel (World Bank, 2004).  
In addition to the formal health sector, there are many unaccounted for 
traditional healers and other informal practitioners known as “doctor choukous” and 
other resellers of medication. These informal health providers are active in both 
rural and urban areas.  
 
3  Data and Survey 
 
The data used in this paper come from the 2004 Quantitative Service Delivery 
Survey (QSDS) for which we drafted the survey instruments, organized the survey   4
field work and monitored data collection for which a local firm was hired. The 
survey’s objective were to collect extensive information on the health sector at the 
frontline level, including resource use, delivery processes, services, staff and patient 
behavior and characteristics. Data were collected between May 1 and July 16, 2004, 
using questionnaires administered to regional delegates, district head doctors, 
health center heads, employees and patients. 
A two-stage sample strategy was used for the facility sample. First, in each of 
the 15 regional delegations, either one or two districts, depending on the number of 
districts in the region, were selected at random.1 Second, in each of the selected 
districts, all the health centers were identified and visited. Also, given the 
importance of the capital city, N’Djamena, all its health centers were included in the 
sample. The final sample of health clinics visited is presented in Table 1. Of the 281 
health centers in the sample in the 14 regions surveyed, approximately two thirds 
are public, 14% are private, 16% are religious and 3% are run by NGOs. About two-
thirds of the health centers are located in rural areas, less than one-quarter in the 
capital and 14% in other urban areas. 
Table 1: Distribution of the Health Centers 
  Capital  Other urban areas  Rural  Total 
Public   26  26  139  191 
Private 19  9  11  39 
Religious 4  2  39  44 
NGO 3  1  3  7 
Total  52 38  191  281 
Source: Chad 2004 QSDS 
Information was also collected from patients using health centers. The 
objective was to interview 10 patients per health center.2  The interviews were 
carried out at a certain distance from the health centers after patients’ visits to the 
                                                 
1 One regional delegation (B.E.T.) was not included in the final sample because of security 
problems in the region at the time of the survey. 
2 The sample strategy was to interview the first 10 patients after they had received a 
consultation, or all the patients that had consulted that day if the total was not greater than 
10.The design of the patient sample is complicated by the random nature of patients visiting 
clinics at different hours each day. Some health centers might receive no patients one day 
and more than it can handle the day after.  Without specific information on patient 
distribution, it is difficult to develop a strategy for representative sampling.   5
clinics. The patients sample is made of 1801 individuals (Table 2). About 61% come 
from rural areas, 20% are from the capital city and 19% are from other urban 
centers. About 2/3 of the patients in the sample are women. In rural areas and in the 
private health centers, the proportion of men in the sample is slightly higher (47%). 
Religious clinics treat the same proportion of men and women. 
The average patient is 21 years old (median 20 years). Less than half of the 
patients in the sample have been to school (45%). In rural areas, this proportion is 
only 38%, versus 64% for patients in the capital. The average monthly household 
revenue of patients is 44 824 FCFA (US$90.30). The median revenue is much lower, 
at 15  000  FCFA (US$30.22), which illustrate the important differences in the 
distribution of income. In the capital, average income is three times higher than in 
rural areas and 1.7 times greater than in other urban centers. 
Table 2:  Sample of Patients 
  TYPE   L OCATION 
 Public  Private  Religious  NGO    Capital 
Other 
Urban  Rural  Total 
                 
  Number of patients  1218  229  305  49    364  342  1095  1801 
  Percentage  67.6  12.7  16.9  2.7    20.2  19.0  60.8  100.0 
  Men (%)  32.7  46.9  41.3  33.3    32.5  32.8  38.1  36.0 
  Age (years)  19.5  24.1  21.0  23.6    20.1  19.6  20.9  20.5 
  Schooling (%)  37.5  67.0  53.8  61.7    63.9  45.9  38.0  44.5 
    Secondary +  18.6  47.1  23.7  34.1    44.6  25.7  16.0  23.5 
  Household Revenue 
    Mean (000CFA)  36.1 100.2  31.1  99.3    86.1  49.7  29.9  44.8 
    Median (000CFA)  15.0  30.5  15.0  23.3    30.0  30.0  12.0  15.0 
Source: Chad 2004 QSDS and authors’ calculations. 
 
We also make use of the ECOSIT II household survey carried out in Chad in 
2004 that covers 6,697 households and 39,356 individuals. We match the data with 
the facility survey in order to derive asset based annual income measures. 
 
4  Supply of Health Care: Services and Infrastructure 
 
Before examining patients’ characteristics and choices of health facilities, we first 
describe the health care infrastructure and services available to the population, 
including the level of competition among health providers in Chad.    6
Public sector health facilities account for approximately one-half of all health 
centers available in the capital, compared with three-quarters in rural areas (see 
Table 3). The private for-profit sector is mainly present in urban areas, and is absent 
from seven of the country’s 14 regions.  
 







  Public Private  Religious  NGO    Capital 
Other 
Urban Rural  CHAD 
Number of clinics  191  39  44  7    52  38  191  281 
    %  68.0  13.9  15.7  2.5    18.5  13.5  68.0  100 
% Doctors  0.4  10.2  0.7  8.2    10.5 2.4 0.07  2.3 
% Midwives  5.0  5.6  15.2  2.4    2.0 3.4 8.15  6.4 
% Other Qualified  32.3  36.8  30.3  45.2    41.6 34.7 30.45  33.1 
% Non-Qualified  62.3  47.4  53.8  44.2    45.9 59.5 61.33  58.2 
Hospitalization 3.4  17.1  18.6  14.3    8.0 5.3 8.5  8.0 
Normal del.  78.5  45.7  90.7  57.1    32.0 57.9 91.6  75.6 
Complicated del.  40.0  31.4  72.1  28.6    6.0 26.3 58.2  43.8 
Malaria 98.9  94.3  97.7  85.7    92.0 97.4 99.4  97.7 
IRA 98.3  85.7  97.7  71.4    86.0 97.4 98.3  95.9 
Diarrhea 98.9  94.3  97.7  85.7    92.0 97.4 99.4  97.7 
Malaria tests   8.3  48.6  16.3  28.6    40.0 18.4  7.9 15.4 
Electricity (%)  19.9 71.8 54.6 71.4    71.2 57.9 18.9  33.8 
Potable water (%)  59.2  84.6  68.2  100    94.2 73.7 55.5  65.1 
Septic tank (%)  53.9  71.8  75.0  71.4    76.9 71.1 53.4  60.1 
Telephone (%)  6.8  48.7  6.8  57.1    51.9 21.1  2.1 13.9 
Beds (%)  37.7  82.1  65.9  71.4    59.6 60.5 44.0  49.1 
   Mean (Number)  1.2  4.6  8.7  3.7    3.5 2.7 2.8  2.9 
Maternity beds (%)  12.0  25.6  34.1  14.3    9.6 15.8 19.9  17.4 
    Mean (Number)  0.2  0.9  1.5  0.9    0.4 0.4 0.5  0.5 
Source: Chad 2004 QSDS and authors’ calculations. 
 
Approximately one-third of the capital’s health centers are privately owned, 
compared with one-quarter in other urban areas and only 6% in rural areas. Private 
clinics rank second in importance in urban areas, while religious clinics rank second 
in rural areas, accounting for one-fifth of health centers. 
 
4.1 Personnel 
A salient feature of the Chadian health system is that there are very few doctors at 
the primary care level. Indeed, doctors make up only 2.3% of total personnel in 
health centers (Table 3). The rural area has virtually no doctors practicing in health 
centers. Doctors are rare in the public clinics. Only one doctor practices in a public   7
health center in a rural area in our sample, and it is in the rural area of the capital. 
Almost all the doctors in the public sector practice in district or regional hospitals. 
Most doctors are practicing in the capital and are mainly active in the private sector 
(73% of the 63 doctors in the sample).Qualified personnel other than doctors, such as 
nurses or technical agents make up about a third of the work force and are more 
numerous in NGOs. Midwives, who represent on average 6.4% of health personnel, 
are mainly present in religious clinics (15.2%) and in rural areas (8.1%). In fact, non-
qualified staff make up the majority of health center staff (58.2% on average), with 
an even greater representation in rural areas (61.3%) and the public sector (62.3%). 
 
4.2 Services 
Table 3 presents the percentage of health centers that offer the main curative health 
services. Substantial differences are observed in terms of ownership types and 
location. In particular, private health centers and especially religious clinics are 
more active in terms of hospitalization compared with public clinics. Religious clinics 
are also especially active in terms of deliveries, both normal and complicated. The 
services of normal deliveries are also more available in rural areas as 92% of centers 
offer these services, compared with 34% of clinics located in the capital. The 
difference between the two regions reflects the distance to hospitals in rural areas. 
Laboratory tests, particularly for malaria, are more accessible in private 
health clinics: 42% of such centers offer these services, compared with only 8% of the 
public health clinics. 
 
4.3 Basic Infrastructure 
Important deficiencies are present in terms of basic infrastructure in health centers 
in Chad, including electricity, water and sanitation (Table 3). About 2/3 of health 
centers do not have access to electricity, especially public clinics (80% versus only 
28% of private clinics and NGOs). Access to potable water is also limited, and about 
1/3 of centers function without drinking water. Furthermore, about 40% of centers 
do not have sanitation infrastructure. This proportion of clinics in rural areas is 
46%, equal to that of public clinics. About a quarter of clinics of other affiliations do 
not have these infrastructures. Even in the capital city, 30% of clinics are not 
connected to municipal sanitation or septic tanks.    8
4.4 Beds 
Approximately half of the sample’s health centers have beds available to patients, 
including about 1/6 reserved for maternity wards. In rural areas, 53% of the beds 
available are in religious centers, while in the capital it is mainly the private clinics 
that offer beds (i.e. 64% of the 197 total beds available). 
 
4.5 Competition 
Competition among health providers could have important effects on service quality 
and prices. Despite some improvements of access to health services in the country 
over the last decade, the rural populations still suffer severe shortages in health 
services supply, and competition is very limited. Indeed, most of health centers 
visited in rural areas are the sole provider of care within a 2 km radius (Table 4) and 
thus enjoy a monopoly status (84%).  







  Public Private  Religious NGO    Capital  Other 
Urban  Rural 
Total 
Percentage  (%)                
Monopoly  63.4 25.6  77.3  14.3    1.9  13.2 83.8 59.1 
Private  Competition 11.0  41.0  0.5  28.6   51.9 21.1 3.1 14.6 
Number (of 
competitors)                
Total  Competition  0.7 2.4  0.4  1.7   3.0  1.7 0.2 0.9 
Private  sector  0.16  1.0  0.05  0.29    1.08  0.29 0.04 0.26 
Source: Chad 2004 QSDS and authors’ calculations. 
 
The capital offers a strikingly different picture since only 2% of the health centers 
can be considered as monopolies (in the sense defined above), 52% of them face fierce 
competition from the private for-profit sector. Overall, however, competition is weak, 
with 0.3 clinics located in a 2-km radius of health centers visited. Religious clinics 
tend to locate in areas less occupied by other health centers; only 0.6 centers are 




   9
5  Characteristics of Patients’ Visits and Choices of Facilities 
 
Having examined the supply of health care infrastructure and services available to 
the population, we now examine the characteristics of patients using clinics, in 
particular reported symptoms and costs of visits.  
 
5.1 General Characteristics of Patients 
Characteristics of patients visiting health centers vary considerably according to the 
type of facility and location (Table 2). In the capital city in particular, a larger 
proportion of patients using the private clinics and NGOs are schooled (80% vs 60% 
for patients using public and religious clinics).  
The patients of religious and public clinics seem also to be poorer. Indeed, the 
average monthly income of patients in these centers is 31,100 FCFA (US$63) and 
36,000 FCFA (US$73), respectively, compared with about 100,000 FCFA (US$ 201) 
in private clinics and NGOs. Furthermore, in the capital the average revenue of 
patients in private clinics is 3.5 times higher than those using public and religious 
clinics. The tendency is about the same outside of the capital, but the difference is 
less pronounced between patients using private clinics and others (1.8  to 1 on 
average).  
 
5.2 Main Reasons for Visits 
The main reason patients invoke to justify their visit to the facility is malaria, a 
distant first which affects half of the patients (see table 5).  Diarrheic problems are 
the second most common complaint, affecting about 1 in 5 patients, followed by 
cough, weight loss and worms. 
About a quarter of patients complain of multiple symptoms during their 
medical visits. These patients represent a larger proportion of patients in public 
health centers (27%) than private centers (15%) or NGOs (12%).3  
                                                 
3 Few differences are noted between urban and rural areas in terms of number of symptoms 
reported, but significant differences are observed among regional delegations. In Salamat, 
almost half of the patients report multiple problems (on average 1.8 problems) and more that 
43% in Guera and Ouaddai. In contrast, less than 7% of patients in Logone Occidental report 
multiple symptoms to justify their visits to health centers.   10
The number of days during which patients reported symptoms before visiting 
a health center is on average 10 (median 5 days). Regional variations observed could 
be linked to relative access to health centers. For instance, the average duration of 
symptoms is three times longer in Salamat than in Tandjile (14 days vs. 4.6 days). 
 
Table 5: Reasons for Visits and Symptom Duration 
  TYPE   LOCATION 
 
Public Private  Religious  NGO    Capital 
Other 
Urban  Rural  Total 
Reason for the visit (%)                 
    Malaria  51.6  43.6  50.2  24.2   52.1 48.5 49.4 49.7 
    Diarrhea  21.4  17.8  22.5  9.1    16.8  20.8  22.0  20.8 
    Cough  11.6  4.0  4.1  15.2    10.1  11.3  8.8  9.5 
    Weight loss   19.6  4.5  7.4  15.2    8.4  7.9  10.1  9.4 
    Worms  8.2  7.9  15.9  3.0    9.4  6.5  10.1  9.3 
Multiple Symptoms (%)  28.8  14.9  22.0  12.2    24.2  25.7  25.8  24.4 
Duration of symptoms                 
    Number of days Average  10.0  11.2  10.7  10.8    12.9 11.2 9.2 10.3 
    Number of days Median  5  5  6  7    5  6  5  5 
                 
Source: Chad 2004 QSDS and authors’ calculations. 
 
5.3 Costs of visits 
Table 6 presents total payments for a health visit reported by patients and 
the share of these costs represented by consultation fees, laboratory tests and 
prescribed medications. Overall, the average cost of a visit is 2,516 FCFA (US$5.07). 
Average payments are much higher in the capital but relatively similar in rural 
areas and other urban centers.  
The least expensive visits are noted in NGOs and religious clinics, with an 
average cost of 1,500 FCFA. By contrast, visits to private clinics are by far the most 
expensive especially. in the capital where a visit to a private clinic cost on average 
close to 6 times more than in a public clinic.    11
Table 6: Composition of Costs of Visits (percentage and total costs) 
 T YPE   L OCATION 
  Public  Private Religious NGO    Capital 
Other 
Urban  Rural  Total 
Consultation (%)  15.8  19.2  18.9  14.8    16.7  22.6  13.6  16.9 
Laboratory Tests (%)  10.0  21.4  6.1  0.7    18.8  3.2  1.9  12.0 
Medication (%) 
  74.2 59.4  75.0  84.5    64.5  74.1 85.1  71.1 
Total costs (FCFA)  2375  4987  1601  1397    4320  1191  1276  2516 
Source: Chad 2004 QSDS and authors’ calculations. 
 
Examining the composition of costs of medical visits to health centers, 
expenditures on medication represent about ¾ of patients’ total costs. Medical 
consultation costs represent less than 14% of the total cost of a visit in rural areas 
compared with 23% in urban areas other than the capital. As for laboratory tests, it 
is only in the capital that they represent a significant portion of patient 
expenditures (19%).  
 
5.4 Patients’ Knowledge of Alternative Care Availability 
Before examining the choice of health facilities by patients and in particular the 
patterns of bypassing, it is useful to examine patients’ knowledge of health care 
services available.  
As shown in Table 7, about 39% of patients report that health care providers 
(either formal or informal) other than the one they visited the day of the survey are 
located close to their home. With respect to the modern health sector only, about a 
quarter of the patients report having access to alternative health centers or 
hospitals.  
It is interesting to note that the capital city offers not only more modern 
health service providers but also more informal providers. Indeed, 28% of patients 
there report having informal care in their neighborhood versus 19% in rural areas.    12
Table 7: Patient’s Knowledge of Alternative Care Availability (percentages) 
  TYPE   LOCATION 
 Public  Private  Religious  NGO    Capital 
Other 
Urban  Rural  Total 
Total  competition   33.7 63.8 35.1  77.6    64.8  38.6 30.4  38.9 
Formal  sector  23.3 53.3 21.6  69.4    59.9  32.5 16.2  28.1 
   Public clinics  12.2  29.8  14.4  52.1    38.3  18.2  7.7  15.9 
   Private clinics  4.9  21.5  3.9  20.8    22.6  5.9  2.7  7.3 
   Religious and NGO  1.2  6.1  1.0  8.3    7.4  0.9  0.6  2.0 
Informal  sector  15.9 30.1 20.0  26.5    27.8  9.1  18.6  18.7 
   Docteur Choukous  9.7  26.3  9.2  10.4    21.7  4.7  10.6  11.7 
   Traditional healers  9.2  11.4  14.1  16.7    13.0  5.3  11.3  10.5 
Source: Chad 2004 QSDS and authors’ calculations. 
 
6  Measuring and Assessing Bypassing 
 
Having examined in the previous sections the characteristics of health service 
provision as well as patients’ characteristics we now examine how these affect 
choices of health facilities. The focus is on individuals’ decision to bypass available 
health facilities. 
6.1. Measuring  Bypassing 
Previous work on bypassing, e.g. Akin and Hutchinson (1999) or Leonard et al. 
(2002), have mostly relied on a theoretical measure of bypassing. In contrast to this 
approach, this paper measures bypassing using data collected from patients about 
their knowledge of existing alternative providers in their neighborhood. Therefore, a 
patient is said to have engaged in bypassing if and only if (1) she knows about other 
available providers, and (2) the facility she attended is not the closest from her 
household within the pool of providers available. 
Akin and Hutchinson (1999) study bypassing in one district in Sri Lanka. 
They match a facility dataset which contains the complete set of facilities in the 
district with a sample of households surveyed in the same district. Both household 
and facility geographic information is available, they can therefore compute for each 
household the distance between the household and all facilities in the district. In the 
household survey, individuals indicate the facility they visit during their last illness 
spell. Bypassing is then assumed if the facility visited is the not the nearest to the   13
household as determined by computed distances. This procedure implicitly assumes 
that households have perfect information about their health care market. The same 
implicit assumption is also used in Leonard et al. (2002), where from the registry 
records of a sample of 42 facilities, the authors draw a sample of users. Using 
patients’ information recorded by the facility, which in addition to age, gender and 
symptoms, include the village of origin, the authors compute distances to health 
centers.  
Contrary to Akin and Hutchinson (1999) and Leonard et al. (2002) this paper 
defines bypassing using the information set of the patients. Each patient was asked 
whether she could have used other facilities (formal or informal) than the one she 
just visited. Then, for each such facility and the facility she was in, the patient were 
asked to provide information on the distance and travel time from the facility to her 
household. The set of facilities the patient identified is labeled her “local health 
market”. Moreover, all facilities which are farther from the patient’s household, 
according to her own estimated distance, than the facility she ultimately visited are 
“bypassed” facilities. 
This measure of bypassing seems more adequate than previous attempts to 
measure the phenomenon for at least two reasons. First, the patient’s knowledge of 
her ‘theoretical’ health care market is in all likelihood imperfect, therefore using 
estimated distances a patient may be considered to have bypassed a given facility 
which she “in fact” does not know about. Second, individuals do not forcefully have a 
good sense of distance and their estimated distance may be different from the 
“objective” distance as computed from maps. Our definition of bypassing, however, is 
based on the patient’s own judgment of distance to available facilities. It is the 
richness of our data set that affords us the availability of -what we contend is- a 
more accurate measure of bypassing.  
6.2  The Importance of Bypassing 
The extent of bypassing of the formal and informal sectors, measured using patients’ 
information, is presented in Table 8. More than a third (35.6%) of the patients had 
at least two providers (formal or informal) available to them, cherry-picked their 
preferred provider on the basis of either cost or quality, and knowingly travelled a 
higher distance to seek care. While about 1/4 (24.6%) of patients bypass the modern   14
sector including hospitals and pharmacies in their local health market, only 18% of 
patients choose to bypass informal providers (i.e. traditional) in their neighborhood 
to go to a modern health center. 
Unsurprisingly, it is in areas where competition is the fiercest that bypassing 
is more intense. In the capital city, 54% of patients claim they bypassed at least one 
modern health provider to seek care elsewhere. This number drops down to 28% in 
urban areas, and 14% in rural areas probably because of the low level of care supply. 
Once the informal sector is accounted for, the bypassing rates jump to 28% for 
the rural areas, 34% in other urban areas, and 61% for  the capital city N’djaména. 
The inclusion of the informal sector therefore doubles the rural bypassing rate, 
which is probably due to the large number of informal care providers in those areas 
who fill in the void left by modern health centers.  
Furthermore, patients who attend private clinics, both for- and not-for-profit 
are more likely to engage in bypassing behavior. Indeed, 57% of NGOs’ patients and 
49% of private clinics’ patients have bypassed another modern provider, vs. 20% and 
19% for patients in public and religious facilities respectively. In the capital where 
more than half of the patients bypassed a modern facility, 34% have bypassed a 
public facility vs. 21% a private facility. Overall, 14% of the patients say they 
bypassed a public provider and 6.8% a private provider. As for the informal sector, it 
has been bypassed by 18.2% of the patients. 
 
Table 8: Bypassing of Health Centers (Percentage) 
 TYPE    LOCATION 
 Public  Private  Religious  NGO    Capital 
Other 
Urban Rural  Total 
              
Public Clinics  10.5  28.2  12.5  44.7    34.7  15.1  6.8  14.0 
Private clinics  4.8  19.4  3.9  17.0    21.0  4.4  2.9  6.8 
Non profit (religious/NGO)  1.8  6.2  1.3  6.4    7.0  0.9  1.4  2.4 
Formal sector + hospitals and 
pharmacies   20.1 49.3  19.0  57.4    54.3  27.8  13.9 24.6 
Informal sector  15.6  28.6  19.3  25.5    26.0  8.9  18.5  18.2 
 
Total (formal + informal)  30.3 60.8  32.8  70.2    60.5  33.7  28.1 35.6 
Source: Chad 2004 QSDS and authors’ calculations. 
Note: The numbers do not add up to the total because a patient may bypass more than one type of health care provider. 
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Table 9 presents the likelihood of bypassing for individuals who live in 
households that belong to the poorest and richest income quintiles in Chad. It shows 
that (conditional on seeking care) patients in rich households are significantly more 
likely to bypass providers than poorer patients. More specifically, patients in the 5th 
quintile are 3 times more likely to bypass modern providers as are patients in the 
poorest quintile. Nearly 37% of patients in the 5th income quintile bypassed a 
provider compared to 20% of patients in the 1st quintile. 
Table 9: Bypassing of Health Centers by Quintile (Percentage) 
 1
st Quintile  5
th Quintile 
      Modern sector  9.9  28.6 
     Informal sector  12.7  18.3 
     Total   19.8  36.5 
Source: Chad 2004 QSDS and authors’ calculations. 
 
Focusing on the bypassing of private facilities, we observe that it is mostly people in 
the two richest quintiles who bypass private providers, with a significantly higher 
probability for the 5th quintile as shown in Table 10. It is also noteworthy that for all 
income groups, patients of private providers are more likely to bypass another 
private facility. For all levels of income, the patients of the formal public sector are 
the least likely to bypass a private provider. 
Table 10: Bypassing Private Facilities 
  Public   Private    Not-for-Profit 
Quintile  n 
% Bypassed 
private   n 
% Bypassed 
private   n 
% Bypassed 
private 
                
Poorest  302 2.6    18 5.6    58  3.4 
Q2  238 1.7    30 0.0    104  2.9 
Q3  241 4.6    32 6.2    77  2.6 
Q4  239 4.6    49  16.3    63  9.5 
Richest  185 13.0    98 33.7    50  14.0 
Source: Chad 2004 QSDS and authors’ calculations. 
 
6.3  Costs of bypassing  
Because of the important impact on travel and direct medical costs involved, 
bypassing decisions are not casually taken by patients. By visiting a health center 
which is not the closest to their residence, the ‘bypassers choose to travel a distance 
on average twice longer than patients who go to the closest alternative (Table 11). 
The average travel time between the house and the clinic is also multiplied by two,   16
from about one hour to two hours. In rural area, this travel time to reach the clinic 
goes from 64 to 160 minutes on average, and in the capital from 29 to 49 minutes. 
In addition to traveling longer and farther, patients who bypass facilities 
nearer to their residence to seek care better adapted to their health needs, also 
accept frequently to incur higher user direct costs of care. Indeed, bypassing patients 
spend on average more than 2.5 times on consultation costs than do patients who 
use health centers closer to their home. When total costs of visits, including tests 
and prescription drugs, are considered, bypassers spend on average 2.3 times more.  
While evidence seems to indicate that bypassing is mainly motivated by a 
quest for greater quality of care in more distant centers, there are also indications 
that bypassing can partly be explained as an attempt to reduce the cost of health. In 
our data, this is particularly true for patients who bypass a modern provider to visit 
an NGO. Indeed, those patients have spent on average 71% and 32% less than those 
who attended the closest clinic in rural areas and the capital city respectively. Also, 
patients using private clinics in the capital and that have bypassed a modern 
provider have spent on average 28% less than patients in private clinics that have 
chosen the closest provider (12  279 FCFA vs. 17  053 FCFA respectively) (not 
illustrated). 
Table 11: Cost Incurred by Bypassing the Formal Health Sector 
 T YPE   L OCATION 
  Public  Private Religious  NGO    Capital 
Other 
Urban  Rural  Total 
Distance from Residence (Km)               
      Without bypassing  7.7  3.2  5.6  3.1    3.2  3.4  8.6  6.8 
      With bypassing  14.5  8.7  21.3  27.1    11.2  15.8  18.0  14.3 
Travel time (Min)               
      Without bypassing  57.2  64.8  54.9  42.1    29.4  58.0  63.7  57.5 
      With bypassing  186.7  43.2  159.3  51.1    48.6  258.2  161.0  123.8 
Consultation costs (FCFA)               
      Without bypassing  173  614  300  285    569  265  167  245 
      With bypassing  211  1348  512  105    1041  292  243  608 
Total costs of visits (FCFA)               
      Without bypassing  1491  3794  1697  1472    4603  1285  1378  1795 
      With bypassing  1835  8551  3163  1333    6642  2011  2374  4031 
Source: Chad 2004 QSDS and authors’ calculations. 
 
The next section presents a simple model of bypassing which will then be 
tested empirically. 
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7  The Bypassing Model 
 
Patients engage in bypassing behavior, if among providers available to them 
they knowingly choose to seek treatment in a facility which is not the closest to 
them. As already noted, it is important to specifically ask to the patients questions 
relative to their knowledge of available care options. The patients are asked to 
evaluate the distance they traveled to seek care in the facility they are at, and the 
distance from their home to all other facilities they could have gone to. This permits 
to precisely delineate the patients’ local health market and compute the effective 
measure of bypassing in contrast to a “theoretical” one as in Akin and Hutchinson 
(1999) and Leonard et al. (2002). A patient is then considered to have bypassed all 
the facilities which are nearer than the chosen facility.  
Let us quickly explicit our bypassing model. Each individual is characterized 
by the couple  ) , ( h y  which is income and health stock. The welfare of an individual is 
defined by the utility function  ) , ( h x u  where x is the consumption of the numeraire 
good.4 Everybody enjoys the same initial stock of health  0 H . Any individual can be 
hit by an exogenous health shock with probability α  which for the sake of simplicity 
is independent of income y.5 The health shock translates into a (temporary) loss of 
health stock of size  ] , [ L L ∈ l  which reflects the (perceived) severity of the illness. 
When sick, the individual can either seek care by visiting a provider, or stay home. 
Let the probability of cure when visiting a provider j which offers care of quality qj 
be  ), ( j q π  in case the sick does not seek care the probability of cure is  ). 0 ( π 6 The 
probability of cure is assumed increasing and concave in the quality offered, i.e. 
0 > ′ π  and  . 0 < ′ ′ π  The quality of the providers depends on its characteristics some 
of which are observable by the patients. The patients then form beliefs on quality of 
care offered by each available provider, which factor in their final care seeking 
decisions. Regarding (expected) health status, there are three possible states for any 
given individual: 
                                                 
4  The utility function could take the simple quasi-linear form i.e.  h x v h x u ⋅ + = θ ) ( ) , ( , to allow income to 
influence the choice of the provider, see for instance Gertler and van der Gaag (1990). 
5 The probability of getting sick could be contingent to income level and become α(y) to account for instance for better 
preventive practices, or safer household health related behaviors, in higher income groups. 























It is in the last two states of nature that the health shock has hit. In the 
second state of nature the sick individual does not visit a provider, whereas she does 
in the third. Visiting a provider increases, in expected terms, the recovered health 
stock. 
The health market is defined by all health providers in the country. We 
assume without loss of generality that there are N such providers and the health 
market is therefore  {}
N
j
j P HM 1 = = , where Pj is provider j. Each person has, however 
access only to a local health market in which a subset of providers operates. We 




i j i P LHM 1 provider    knows      , = = . We do 
not, however, restrict the local health market to a defined geographic area. Indeed, a 
far away facility in the country’s capital may well be in the local health market of a 
rural dweller. What is important is that the care seeker knows about the facility and 
has contemplated the option of using it. 
A sick individual will pick, within her local health market, the facility that 
maximizes her utility. All the other facilities will be considered as bypassed 
facilities. More formally among the facilities ( )
i LHM k ik k k t q p ∈ , ,  that charge pk for 
consultation, offer a perceived quality of care qk and which patient i will reach by 
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We do not consider self-medication because in our data we only have people 
who indeed sought care.7 The patient will choose the facility that maximizes her 
(expected) utility. The patient will choose provider j over provider k if (1) the patient 
can afford facility j, and (2) the income value of the differential gain in recovered 
health stock from visiting provider j instead of k outweighs the utility loss incurred 
because of the higher total costs involved in choosing provider j, and (3) condition (2) 
must be satisfied for all facilities in the patient’s LHM when compared to facility j.8 
The patient engaged into bypassing if her LHM is not restricted to the facility 
they visited. Although we know the number of facilities a patient bypassed, we can 
not identify those specific facilities. We resort to assigning to each patient a LHM 
which coincides with the medical district to which the chosen facility belongs. 
Therefore, conditional on the information that the patient has bypassed some 
facilities, we consider that the patient has bypassed the “average” facility in the 
district i.e. 
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8  Econometric Specification and Analysis  
 
This section presents the econometric specification used to implement our bypassing 
model. The data requirements for implementing such a model are impressive. 
Indeed, for each patient, we must be able to identify all providers in her LHM but 
also explicitly link the providers to the health facility survey. Unfortunately, the 
survey did not collect information on each provider in the patient’s LHM. Instead, 
for each type of provider, the survey collected information on the number of such 
facility bypassed and the distance of the closest such facility to the patient’s home. 
Therefore, we cannot attach a provider from the facility survey to any particular 
patient’s LHM. However, since the survey provides a census of facilities within each 
                                                 
7 Because we observe only individuals who went to the health provider and thus decided to seek care, we 
will only consider utilities conditional on falling sick and seeking care to a provider. Self-medication is a 
dominated strategy for the patients in our sample. 
8 Note that no patient would visit a more expensive provider whose expected quality if care is also lower 
than another facility in the patient’s local health market.   20
district visited, we can aggregate the observable information on the facilities to build 
the “average district facility” which is defined as the facility bypassed by patients. 
To implement the above model econometrically, we posit that the utility that 
patient  i derives from visiting provider j, following most of the literature on 
provider’s choice, is given by: 
 
ij ij i j ij Z X U μ γ β α + ⋅ + ⋅ + =   (1) 
 
where Xi represents the patients characteristics such as age, education, income, etc., 
Zij is the chosen facility’s characteristics such as its quality as perceived by the 
patient, the price it charges for the patient’s ailment, the distance from the patient’s 
home, etc., and  ij μ  is simply an error term. Many variables affect the quality of the 
facility some of which are easy to gauge by patients such as whether the personnel is 
amicable, infrastructure is in good condition, water and electricity are readily 
available, etc. Some determinants of the facility’s quality, however, transcend the 
patients’ knowledge. Patients rarely know whether the doctor exerted the optimal 
effort and provided the best prescription for an ailment. Often, patients are even 
unable to assess whether the doctor gave the right diagnosis.  
The average facility in the patient’s local health market would provide her 
with the utility  
 
i i i i Z X U μ γ β α + ⋅ + ⋅ + =    (2) 
 
The patient chooses facility j and bypasses the others if (1) if greater than (2). 
We know the facility in which the patient sought care and whether or not she 
bypassed other facilities. The model we use to explore further the bypassing 
phenomenon in Chad is the following simple probit model:  
 
)) ( ) ( ) (( ) , , | Bypass Pr( i ij i ij i j i ij i Z Z Z Z X μ μ γ β β − + − + Χ ⋅ − Φ =  (3) 
 
Note that the probit specification stems from our lack of data on the facilities that 
each patient specifically bypassed. Had we had this information, we would instead have 
considered a (nested) conditional logit or a multinomial probit, which are the usual   21
models for this type of exercise. Many authors, including Mwabu et al. (1993) and 
Leonard et al. (2002), use a conditional logit but assume the patient knows the facilities it 
bypassed. Mwabu et al. (1993) arbitrarily choose for each type (government, mission, 
private, self-treatment) of facility not chosen by the patient, the nearest such facility as 
the bypassed facility. This is arbitrary because it may well be that the patient had no 
knowledge of a closer facility, as a matter of fact the patient may have chosen that 
theoretically bypassed facility had she known about it. 
 
8.1.  Estimation of Household Incomes 
 
A serious limitation of our data concerns the patient’s household income. The patient 
or the person who accompanies her was asked about the total income of her 
household. However, we do not know the relationship of the interviewees to their 
head of household, it is therefore not clear whether either of them is the best person 
to answer such a question. For these reasons, we chose to discard the income reports 
from the patients and instead estimated those incomes using data from a nationally 
representative household survey which was being conducted around the same time. 
This survey, ECOSIT II, covered 6,697 households and 39,356 individuals across the 
country.  
In order to link the surveys, we incorporated the module on asset holdings 
and dwelling characteristics of the household survey’s questionnaire into our 
patient’s questionnaire. There is common information on eight assets (appliances 
and vehicles), seven characteristics of the household’s dwelling, further broken down 
into 16 dummy variables. We then use small area estimation methods to estimate 
the income of our patients’ households. Specifically, using the ECOSIT II we run the 
regression Inch=ΣαiAih + ΣβjRjh + εh where Inch is household’s h income, Aih is the 
number of asset i that household h holds, and Rjh are regional dummies and 
household size to estimate the α ˆ  and β ˆ . We then use the estimated coefficients to 
predict our patients’ household income. 
 
8.2. Building  Quality  Indices 
 
Because the quality of health care provided by a health center is likely to influence 
its demand and the likelihood that it is bypassed it is among the main variables of   22
interest in the paper. The measurement of the quality of care is, however, still an 
unsettled issue in the literature. It is also likely that patients’ bypassing decisions 
are partly based on subjective perceptions of the quality offered by facilities in their 
choice set rather than the facilities’ objective quality. It is important for policy to 
determine to which extent, controlling for prices and other relevant variables, 
subjective quality perceptions dominate the providers’ “true” quality which is the 
one that matters for the health of the population. If ceteris paribus patients bypass a 
nearer high-quality facility to seek care to a more remote facility just because their 
perceptions are “wrong”, then there is room for policy intervention through, say, 
report cards to improve the health of the population.  
 
8.2.1.  Objective Quality Indices 
 
The facility survey collected information on the health centers’ infrastructure, 
equipment, and personnel which we use to build three composite indices that 
attempt to capture the objective quality of care. The first index is the infrastructure 
index which is an average of providers’ access to water and electricity. Second, using 
staff data, the personnel index is simply the ratio of skilled to unskilled employees in 
the facility. This index captures the facility’s staff-mix. However, several recent 
studies have shown that counting the number of employees may not provide an 
accurate measure of health workers’ labor supply in the facility because of high 
absenteeism rates. We therefore include the rate of absenteeism in the facility to 
complement the personnel index. A staff is considered absent if she was not on the 
premises of the facility at the time of the survey. On average, about 21% of health 
workers were unaccounted for at the time of the survey. The absenteeism rate is 
even higher for doctors and technicians and reaches an average of 33%. Though, this 
seems low relative to absenteeism rates observed in other developing countries (see 
for instance Chaudhury et al., 2006), it could still negatively impact the quality of 
care offered. 
In addition to these indices, we also constructed a price index using user fees 
the health centers charge for 10 main services such as acute respiratory infections or 
malaria. We also use the difference between each facility’s price index and the   23
district average price index as a control variable. Because they use hard information 
on providers, the four indices described above are dubbed “objective” measures. 
 
8.2.2.  Subjective Quality Indices 
 
To construct the subjective quality indices, we use the survey data on the patients’ 
perceptions of both used and bypassed facilities. The patients were asked to provide 
the reasons they chose the specific facility they visited through a battery of binary 
questions. Among the reasons listed one finds questions related to (1) availability of 
specific services, (2) waiting time, (3) proximity to markets, (4) quality of service, (5) 




Because some patients’ characteristics such as age, gender and education 
level may influence bypassing, they are included as controls in all regressions. Some 
additional controls considered are the type of ailment; the illness’ severity proxied by 
the number of days the patient has been sick, and whether the patient has multiple 
symptoms. Finally, we control for few characteristics of the health facility, such as 
its geographical location, whether it is a monopoly, the number of beds, whether it is 
for-profit, etc. Table A2 in the appendix presents summary statistics of variables. 
Table 12 shows the results of the probit regressions of equation (3). The first 
four models (columns 1-4) show for the whole sample the determinants of bypassing 
specific type of providers, e.g. public health center. The last three models (columns 5-
7) focus on the modern sector, i.e. docteur choukous are not considered, and try also 
to identify differences across income groups by narrowing the sample to patients in 
the 1st and 5th income quintiles. Unlike Akin and Hutchinson (1999), we find that 
income is a key determinant of bypassing behavior. As a matter of fact, individuals 
in the richest quintile are significantly more likely to bypass a provider than 
anybody else. Moreover, the likelihood to bypass a provider increases with income 
(column 5). Patients in the poorest income quintile have a 10.8% lower probability of 
bypassing a modern health provider than patients in the richest quintile (column 5).  
With respect to subjective quality variables, patients are more likely to have 
bypassed another facility when they perceive the facility they went to seek care as   24
offering a higher quality of service. Indeed, patients who claim that the facility they 
visited offers a higher quality of service are 2.9%, 3.1%, and 10.6% more likely to 
have bypassed a public, private, or any type of facility respectively.    25
Table 12: Determinants of Bypassing Behavior - Probit Marginal Effects 
  Patient Bypassed Facility of Type    Bypassed Modern Providers 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)    (5) (6)  (7) 





Household Income Quintiles        
Q1  -0.075 -0.018 -0.017 -0.013    -0.108    
  -1.16 -0.38  (2.12)** (2.64)***    (2.04)**    
Q2  -0.143 -0.083 -0.038  -0.017    -0.165    
  (3.77)*** (5.40)*** (3.26)***  (3.20)***   (6.39)***    
Q3  -0.096 -0.058 -0.027  -0.016    -0.121    
  (2.66)*** (3.16)*** (8.90)***  (4.86)***   (4.11)***    
Q4  -0.051 -0.027 -0.029 -0.007    -0.062    
  -0.99 -1.28  (5.58)*** (1.84)*   (2.07)**    
Patients Subjective Quality Assessments        
Others don’t offer service  0.129  0.081 -0.007  0.01   0.133  -0.021 -0.061 
  (1.68)*  -1.63 -0.78  -1.34   (1.89)*  -0.18 -0.99 
Short wait time  0.051  -0.004  -0.013  -0.002    0.034  0.15  0.024 
  -1.38 -0.17 -1.48  -0.55   -0.89  (1.85)*  -0.26 
Close to markets  -0.019  -0.026  -0.011  0.004    -0.023  0.056  -0.022 
 -0.9  -1.34  -1.62  -0.83    -0.67  -0.82  -0.3 
High quality service  0.106 0.029 0.031  0.003   0.029  0.213  -0.091 
  (3.37)*** (2.02)** (5.31)***  -0.64   -1.04  (2.65)***  -1.24 
Drugs always available  0.018  -0.016  0.007  -0.004    -0.02  0.058  0.095 
  -0.43 -0.78 -0.68  -1.1   -0.91  -0.71  -0.69 
Drugs  cheaper  -0.018 0.002 -0.008  -0.009    -0.007  -0.147  0.005 
  -0.48 -0.09 -0.97  -1.35   -0.22  -1.57  -0.06 
Objective Quality Measures        
Infrastructure (Wat & Elec)  0.066  -0.004  0.016  -0.007   0.04  -0.126  0.047 
 -1.38  -0.27  (2.47)**  -1.48   -1.25  (2.33)**  -0.78 
Skilled Staff ratio  0.022 0.009 0.002  0   0.017  -0.021  0.037 
  (2.79)*** (2.38)** (3.13)***  -0.55  (3.36)***  -0.58  (3.27)*** 
Staff absenteism  -0.004 -0.002  0 0    -0.002  -0.002  -0.006 
  (4.44)*** (3.25)***  -1.2 -0.05    (1.97)**  -1.31  (3.67)*** 
Facility vs District costs  -0.004 0.002 0.001  0   0  -0.055  0 
  (1.65)* (2.28)** (1.94)*  -0.12   -0.02  (1.99)**  -0.03 
Facility Characteristics               
Rural  0.113 -0.04 0.003  -0.013   0.034  0.066  0.15 
  (2.74)*** (1.72)*  -0.17  (1.83)*   -0.86  -0.8  -1.13 
Monopoly  -0.202 -0.071 -0.038  0.006   -0.217 -0.276  -0.284 
  (5.25)*** (2.03)** (2.07)**  -0.74  (4.29)*** (2.71)***  (2.29)** 
Private  0.179 0.058 0.025  0.008    0.127 0.637  0.398 
  (4.96)*** (1.81)* (2.15)**  (1.69)*   (3.26)*** (5.28)***  (2.74)*** 
Not-for-profit   0.068  0.073  -0.01 0.006   0.02  0.289 0.258 
  -1.6  (3.34)***  -1.56 -0.76    -0.72  (2.45)** (3.15)*** 
Beds  0.002  0.001 0.001  0    0.003 0.008  -0.004 
  (4.12)***  -1.56 -1.34 (1.66)*    (3.48)*** (5.17)*** -0.71 
Tests   0.051  0.011  -0.003  0.001    0.048  -0.107  -0.029 
  -1.31 -0.8 -0.21 -0.08   -1.36  -0.8  -0.7 
External Support   0.047 0.009  0.02  -0.005   0.019  0.056  0.272   26
  -1.64 -0.49  (2.10)**  -0.87   -0.74  -0.81  (3.59)*** 
               
Patients Characteristics               
        
Male  0.003 -0.001 0.008  -0.004    0.01  -0.095  -0.003 
  -0.16 -0.07 -1.29  -0.99   -0.56  -1.35  -0.06 
Age  -0.001 0  0  0    0  -0.001 0.003 
  -1.11 -0.74 -0.06  -1.2   -0.06  -0.45  -1.55 
Education  0.061  0.006  0.012  0.001   0.032  0.028  0.052 
  (2.95)***  -0.72  (6.50)***  -1.44  (2.64)***  -0.56  (3.28)*** 
Reason visit  -0.048 0.001 -0.032  -0.003   -0.042  -0.055  -0.059 
  -1.3 -0.05  (3.44)***  -0.46   -1.31  -0.64  -0.77 
Multiple Problems  0.042 0.002 0.021  0.004   0.052  -0.014  0.164 
  -1.53 -0.11  (2.89)***  -1.18  (1.98)**  -0.2  (1.82)* 
Number of days sick  -0.001 0  0 0   0.001  -0.002  0.001 
  -0.65 -1.18  (1.67)* (2.58)***   -1.62  -1.45  -0.94 
Time to reach facility  0 0 0  0   0  0 0.003 
  (2.57)** (2.86)***  -0.53  (2.11)**   -1.61  (2.29)** (1.96)* 
Visited another provider  0.279 0.07 0.026 0.002   0.134 0.649  0.152 
  (4.97)*** (2.73)*** (3.59)***  -0.44  (3.59)*** (6.81)***  (2.13)** 
Observations  1335 1335 1335  1335   1335  257  249 
Pseudo R-squared  0.18 0.2 0.27 0.15    0.25  0.35  0.24 
Log Likelihood  -718.02 -426.7 -246.19 -125.88    -558.15  -100.31  -130.67 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Furthermore, there is strong evidence that patients choose the facility based on their 
expectation that the care they need is available. Indeed, the fact that patients think 
(or know) that other providers do not offer the specific service they need translates 
into a 13.3% higher probability that the patient has bypassed a modern provider to 
seek care.  
Among the objective quality measures, the patients are more responsive to 
the ratio of skilled to unskilled. Interestingly enough, it is also the quality indicator 
patients are better able to gauge and is therefore closer to a subjective measure. 
Patients who bypassed any type of facility, and especially public facilities are more 
likely to visit a facility with a higher proportion of medical staff. Patients in the 
richest income quintile seem even more responsive to that ratio. Staff absenteeism 
reduces the probability that patients have bypassed another facility to come and 
seek care. 
With respect to the price index, the less expensive the facility is relative to 
the average facility in the district, the more likely the patient is to have bypassed   27
another facility. Overall, bypassers appear thus to be motivated by lower prices. 
However, for patients who bypassed a public or private facility, the coefficient is 
positive and significant indicating that they were willing to bypass closer facilities to 
come to that specific facility even though it charges higher prices. This result 
supports the descriptive findings in section 6.3 where we observed that bypassing is 
associated with higher average total costs of medical visits. This result is also 
consistent with the positive coefficient on the quality index for patients bypassing a 
private facility. Therefore, these bypassers appear to be motivated by higher quality 
and thus higher price facilities which in all likelihood are also private. Among 
income quintiles, we observe that patients in the poorest quintile are sensitive to 
price and tend to be significantly deterred by higher prices. On the other hand, 
prices seem not to impact the bypassing behavior of patients in the richest quintile. 
Patients who choose private facilities are much more likely to have bypassed 
another facility. They are 5.8%, 2.5%, 0.8%, and 17.9% more likely to have bypassed 
a public, private, religious, and any type of facility respectively. As for patients’ 
characteristics, the severity of the illness represented by the number of days the 
patients has been sick and the existence of multiple symptoms, lead to significantly 
higher bypassing rates.  
 
8.3.1  Bypassing Urban vs Rural Facilities 
 
As table 5 shows, while competition can be quite intense in urban areas, health 
providers in rural areas often enjoy a monopolistic position. It may then prove useful 
to split the sample and study bypassing behavior within each area. In table 13, we 
present the results for rural and urban patients, along with results for the poorest 
and richest income quintiles. Table 14 how bypassing specific types of providers 
varies between urban and rural areas. We observe that for the subjective quality 
assessments, expecting of a higher quality of service leads to significantly more 
bypassing in urban but not in rural areas. Among urban facilities, the probability 
that a patient bypassed other facilities to come to visit them because they sell drugs 
at a lower price increases by an impressive 17%. The objective quality measures also 
seem to have positive effects in urban but not in rural areas. Better infrastructure 
and more skilled personnel increase the chances the patients in an urban facility are   28
bypassers, whereas a higher rate of staff absenteeism decreases the probability that 
the patient is a bypasser.    29
Table 13: Income Groups Bypassing  Behavior  - Marginal Effects 
  Urban    Rural 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4) (5) (6) 









Household Income Quintiles       
Q1  -0.205       -0.08    
  (2.33)**       (2.73)***    
Q2  -0.177       -0.088    
  (2.37)**       (3.04)***    
Q3  -0.044       -0.087    
  -0.4       (2.91)***    
Q4  -0.105       -0.093    
  (1.81)*       (3.66)***    
Patients Subjective Quality Assessments       
Others don’t offer service  0.128 0.161 0.182   0.138  -0.011 -0.106 
  (2.58)*** (2.25)**  -1.35  (1.87)*  -0.39 -1.1 
Short  wait  time  0.024  0.04  -0.037    0.032 0.054 0.068 
  -0.36 -0.62 -0.17    -1.15  -1.45  -0.94 
Close to markets  -0.033  0.06  -0.033    -0.005  -0.027  -0.065 
  -0.49  -0.81  -0.2    -0.13 -0.69 -0.79 
High quality service  0.07  0.026 -0.036    -0.012  0.042  -0.155 
  (1.69)*  -0.27 -0.3    -0.37  -1.13  (1.86)* 
Drugs always available  -0.062  -0.199  0.08    -0.011  0.005  0.007 
  -0.67 -1.17 -0.66    -0.39  -0.27  -0.06 
Drugs cheaper  0.048  0.17  0.265   -0.018  -0.045  -0.053 
 -0.95  (1.95)*  -1.34   -0.65  (1.65)*  -0.46 
Objective Quality Measures       
Infrastructure (Water and 
Electricity)  0.153 0.192 0.155   -0.034  -0.077  -0.071 
  (2.70)*** (1.84)*  -1.35   -0.65  (2.10)**  -0.42 
Skilled Staff ratio  0.037  0.014  0.03    0.008 -0.006 0.021 
  (4.73)***  -1.15  -1.51    -1.18 -0.34 -0.91 
Staff absenteism  -0.004 -0.01 -0.007   -0.001  0  -0.001 
  (3.24)*** (3.16)*** (2.41)**   -0.81 -0.49 -0.32 
Facility vs District costs  -0.001 0.021 -0.002    0.012  -0.026  0.022 
  -0.43 -1.13 -0.25    -1.11  (2.60)***  -0.62 
Facility Characteristics       
Monopoly  -0.258  -0.094 -0.131   -0.21 -0.109  -0.379 
  (4.00)***  -0.75 -0.38    (3.36)*** (1.72)* (4.35)*** 
Private  0.227  0.131  0.428    0.087    0.359 
  (2.67)***  -1.41  (4.41)***    (2.71)***    (3.10)*** 
Not-for-profit   0.076  -0.177 0.348    -0.006 -0.008 -0.125 
  -0.98  (2.49)** (6.77)***    -0.18 -0.32 -0.85 
Beds 0  0.018  -0.004    0.002 0.004 0.014 
  -0.08 -1.59 -0.22    (3.39)*** (3.35)***  -1.61 
Tests   -0.012  0.021  -0.199    0.087  0.117 0.087 
  -0.52 -0.19  (2.70)***    (2.14)**  -1.56 -0.5 
External Support   0.086  -0.095  0.219   0.008  0.037  0.181 
  (2.37)**  -0.63  (1.76)*   -0.28  -1.43  (2.88)*** 
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Patients Characteristics 
Male  0.011 -0.002 -0.034    0.011  -0.034  0.1 
  -0.34 -0.04 -0.34    -0.43  -1.04  (2.29)** 
Age  0.001 0.001 0.002    0  0  -0.005 
  -0.25  -0.96  -0.7    -0.41 -0.11 -1.38 
Education  0.031  0.005 0.018    0.016  0.021  -0.005 
  (2.01)**  -0.07 -1.17    -1.08  (2.02)**  -0.11 
Reason visit  -0.101 0.063 -0.092    0  -0.01  -0.092 
  -1.53 -1.26 -0.56    -0.01  -0.25  -0.59 
Multiple Problems  0.037  -0.139  0.059   0.054  0.027  0.153 
  -0.64  (2.21)**  -0.48   (3.65)***  -1.45  (2.71)*** 
Number of days sick  0 -0.003  0.001    0.001 0.001 0.002 
  -0.05 -0.93 -0.82    (2.71)*** (2.29)**  -0.76 
Time to reach facility  0 0  0.01   0  0 0.002 
  (2.63)*** (2.41)** (2.74)***   -0.39  (2.07)** (2.07)** 
Visited another provider  0.209  0.246  0.184    0.068  0.054 0.004 
  (3.43)***  -1.43  (1.73)*    (2.33)**  -1.38 -0.04 
Observations  530  110  99    805 139 170 
Pseudo R-squared  0.2  0.28  0.32    0.23 0.31 0.27 
Log Likelihood  -286.05 -43.85  -45.2    -257.09  -36.93  -77.24 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
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Table 14: Bypassing by Type of Facility - Marginal Effects  
  At Least One    Public    Private    Religious 




(5)  (6) 
 
(7) (8) 
  Urban Rural 
 
Urban Rural    Urban Rural    Urban  Rural 
Household Income Quintiles 
 
             
Q1  -0.192 -0.006    -0.064 -0.02    -0.076  -0.005     -0.003 
  -1.51 -0.1    -0.81  -0.69    (10.19)***  -0.69     -0.73 
Q2  -0.146 -0.111    -0.069  -0.028   -0.045  -0.004  -0.037  -0.001 
  (1.65)* (3.08)***    (2.10)**  -1.18   (9.91)***  -0.53   (14.7)***  -0.08 
Q3  -0.048 -0.075    0.025 -0.042    -0.052 -0.013   0  -0.003 
  -0.38 -1.27    -0.3  (2.26)**    (5.81)*** (2.06)**   -0.02  -0.95 
Q4  -0.107  -0.098   0.044  -0.042    -0.029 -0.015    -0.009  -0.006 
  -1.49  (1.84)*   -1.47 (2.07)**    (1.85)* (2.30)**    (9.29)***  -1.39 
Patients Subjective Quality Assessments 
 
             
Others don’t offer service  0.223  0.066  0.057  0.088   -0.008  -0.006    0.009  -0.001 
  (2.64)***  -0.6   -0.59  (2.06)**   -0.69  -0.56    -1.59  -0.18 
Short wait time  0.004  0.069   0.009  -0.014   -0.057  0.004  -0.005  0 
 -0.05  (1.85)*   -0.22  -0.65    (3.12)***  -0.66  -1.21  -0.08 
Close to markets  0.006  -0.025    -0.009  -0.02    -0.012  -0.01    -0.004  0.005 
 -0.1  -0.87    -0.18  -0.93    -0.67  -1.36    -0.67  (1.65)* 
High quality service  0.069  0.106    0.068  0.007   0.06 0.019   -0.003   
 -1.39  (3.33)***    (1.75)*  -0.32   (10.45)*** (2.03)**   -1.19   
Drugs always available  -0.11  0.092   -0.068  0.005   0.024  -0.006    -0.001 -0.001 
  (1.79)*  -1.56    -1.05 -0.32    -1.05  -0.8    -0.39 -0.12 
Drugs cheaper  0.104 -0.071   0.019  -0.001    -0.02  0.001    -0.017 0.007 
  (2.21)** (2.14)**  -0.38  -0.06   -1.16  -0.18    (4.58)*** (4.23)*** 
Objective Quality Measures 
 
             
Infrastructure (Water and 
Electricity)  0.173  0.014   -0.022  0.032   0.059  -0.001  0.003   
  (2.41)**  -0.17  -0.77  -0.92    (2.28)**  -0.07  -0.57   
Skilled Staff ratio  0.035  0.003  0.028  -0.001   0.008  0  0  -0.002 
  (3.30)***  -0.39   (6.55)***  -0.1   (2.69)***  -0.18  -0.07  -0.58 
Staff absenteism  -0.006 -0.002    -0.004  -0.001   -0.001  0  0  0 
  (4.10)***  (2.21)**   (5.67)***  -1.09   (3.08)***  -0.24  -1.13  -1.62 
Facility vs District costs  -0.001 -0.018    0.001 0.007    0.002  -0.002   0  -0.007 
  -0.48 -1.12    -0.46 -0.69    -1.55 -0.34    -1.03  (2.51)** 
Facility Characteristics 
 
             
Monopoly  -0.243 -0.21    -0.13  -0.042   -0.043  -0.039     0.007 
  (2.30)** (4.27)***   (3.12)***  -1.39   -1.14  (2.31)**     -1.58 
Private  0.189 0.23    0.179  0.007   0.056  0.01  0.015  0.049 
  (2.18)** (4.84)***   (3.47)***  -0.25   -1.18  -0.94   (2.26)**  -1.61 
Not-for-profit   0.074 0.05    0.113  0.025    -0.025  -0.01    0.007  -0.002 
  -1.39 -0.86    -1.26 -0.86    -1.48 -1.32    (1.86)*  -0.27 
Beds -0.002  0.002   0.003  0    0  0    0  0.001 
 -0.41  (3.63)***   -1.09  -0.84   -0.12  -1.38    -0.11 (3.75)*** 
Tests   -0.022  0.08    0.01  0.003    -0.023  0.012    -0.006 0.034 
  -1.01 -1.25    -0.37 -0.14    -1.3  -0.59    (2.37)** (1.97)** 
External Support   0.087 0.054    0.064  -0.012   0.099  0.002  0.007   
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Patients Characteristics 
Male  -0.021 0.022    -0.031 0.016    0.031  0.002  -0.001  -0.009 
  -0.59 -0.66    -1.11 -0.81    (1.79)*  -0.22  -0.25  -1.27 
Age  0 -0.002    0.002 0    0  0    0  0 
  -0.04 -1.4    -1.64  -0.12    -0.09  -0.51    -0.29  (1.76)* 
Education  0.035 0.065   0.002  0.002   0.019  0.003   0  0.001 
  (1.80)* (2.24)**   -0.2  -0.16    (3.78)***  -0.73  -0.53  -0.63 
Reason visit  -0.085 -0.011    -0.007  0.01    -0.081  -0.005  -0.011  0.004 
  -1.13 -0.41    -0.15 -0.71    (2.86)***  -0.8   (1.94)*  -0.8 
Multiple Problems  0.014 0.036    -0.019  0.016    0.034 0.013   0.002  0.002 
  -0.32 -1.19    -0.51 -1.2    (1.85)* (2.09)**   -0.68  -0.52 
Number of days sick  -0.001 0    -0.001  0.001   0  0    -0.001 0 
  -0.42 -0.41    -0.79  (3.41)***   -1.48  -1.53    (5.01)*** (3.03)*** 
Time to reach facility  0  0  0  0   0  0  0  0 
  (5.31)***  -1.24   (3.22)***  -0.18   (3.75)***  -1.31   (23.1)***  -1.19 
Visited another provider  0.249 0.284    0.109 0.043    0.042  0.017   0  0.006 
  (3.13)*** (7.51)***   (2.66)*** (2.42)**   (3.79)***  -1.45  -0.02  -1.59 
Observations  530 805    530 805    530  805    405 379 
Pseudo R-squared  0.2  0.18    0.17 0.15    0.27  0.2    0.25 0.25 
Log Likelihood  -293.32 -403.14   -240.58 -174.11   -148.65  -89.21    -62.02  -34.82 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Bypassing in rural areas does not seem to react to medical staff size or 
absenteeism. Indeed, the rural poorest tend to bypass facilities in order to go to 
lower quality level facilities and lower price providers. This is confirmed by the 
negative and significant coefficients on basic infrastructure and on the price 
differential between the facility they attend and the average facility in the district. 
Table 14 which shows the bypassing patterns of specific types of providers 
mirrors table 13. Bypassing a private urban provider implies seeking a provider 
with better infrastructure, and more and better medical personnel. Expectation of a 
higher quality of service leads to an increase of 6% and 1.9% in the likelihood that 
the patient has skipped a private provider. The results obtained for rural areas 
probably reflect the fact that many rural facilities are monopolies and therefore 
rural patients do not have a choice. 
Finally, comparing table 13 and 14 to table 12 of the entire sample makes 
clear that bypassing is an urban phenomenon in Chad. Indeed, table 12 shows that 
among people who seek care in a private facility, overall, there is a significant 
increase of 5.8% that they have bypassed a public facility. This is mostly driven by 
bypassing behavior in urban areas. Indeed, in table 14 the same coefficient is not   33
significant in rural areas, whereas in urban areas the probability is 17.9% higher 
that patients who seek care in a private facility have bypassed a nearer public 
facility. 
 
9  Conclusion 
 
Bypassing reflects the search for health services perceived as better adapted to a 
patient’s needs, along with willingness and ability to pay for care. Bypassing of 
health centers in the choice of a health provider is an important manifestation of 
consumer power. This paper has shown it to be significant in Chad, a country with 
little developed health infrastructure and weak competition. Bypassing is 
particularly intensive in urban areas --especially in N’Djamena, the capital city-- 
with a strong supply of health care services. Rural patients also engage in 
bypassing, but to a much smaller extent. For the most part, patients seek better and 
more adapted services and are willing to invest substantial time and travel cost and 
pay higher service costs to obtain those higher quality services. Not surprisingly, 
higher-income patients wield more consumer power by bypassing more. The article 
unveiled a second type of bypassing behavior, practiced mainly by poorer individuals 
who bypass facilities to seek care from a less expensive provider. This cost reduction 
pattern of bypassing is mainly practiced by the lowest income quintile, especially in 
rural areas, and is associated with a choice of facility which provides significantly 
lower objective quality of care. Hence, contrary to Akin and Hutchinson (1999) 
results in Sri Lanka, we find in Chad that patients are sensitive to service prices 
and that medical expenditure affects choice of facilities. 
The fact that bypassing is mainly an urban phenomenon poses a serious 
question in the allocation of public health resources between urban and rural areas. 
While rural facilities are often overcrowded despite their low quality, urban public 
facilities are underutilized given that they are generally bypassed to the benefit of 
private providers. Rural patients barely can exercise choice and are restricted to 
using the local, poor quality, monopolistic facility in the village. Should the 
government reallocate part of the resources devoted to urban public facilities toward 
rural facilities that could therefore provide a better quality of care to their captive 
market? Because of the rise of urban poverty, this reallocation also involves a trade-  34
off between increasing quality of care in the rural areas to the detriment of urban 
areas. Ultimately, a reallocation of public funds will have to be carefully done and 
monitored to ensure that additional public resources do reach rural facilities, 
especially in Chad where leakage of public funds has been shown to be quite 
substantial (see Gauthier and Wane, 2007). 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Characteristics of patients of the 1st and 5th revenue quintiles 
  1
st Quintile  5
th Quintile 
Average Revenue (FCFA)  4 884  190 211 
Age (years)  28,6  31,5 
Women (%)  67  46 
Scolarised (%)  8,3  45,2 
Rural (%)  79,9  41,3 
Work (%)  9,1  57,9 
Electricity (%)  4,8  26,6 
Water (%)  11,5  47,6 
Toilet (%)  4,0  30,2 






Table A2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable n  Mean  S.D.  Mdn 
        
Others don’t offer service  1795  0.1  0.3  0 
Short wait time  1795  0.51  0.5  1 
Close to markets  1795  0.36  0.48  0 
High quality service  1795  0.69  0.46  1 
Drugs always available  1795  0.61  0.49  1 
Drugs cheaper  1795  0.72  0.45  1 
Rural  1801 0.61  0.49  1 
Monopoly  1801 0.5  0.5  1 
Private   1801 0.13  0.33  0 
Not for profit  1801 0.2  0.4  0 
Test  1790 0.1  0.3  0 
Beds  1801 2.98  9.73  1 
Mean Price  1801 -0.44  2.96  -0.51 
Men  1794 0.47  0.5  0 
Age  1796 30.32 11.32  28 
Education  1775 0.73  0.94  0 
Number of problems  1801 0.36  0.48  0 
Number of days sick  1476 12 18.76  5 
Travel time to health center  1766 68.45 271.31  20 
Prior visits  1801 0.2  0.4  0 
 
 